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How does language impact cognition and perception? A growing number of studies show
that language, and speciﬁcally the practice of labeling, can exert extremely rapid and perva-
sive effects on putatively non-verbal processes such as categorization, visual discrimination,
and even simply detecting the presence of a stimulus. Progress on the empirical front, how-
ever, has not been accompanied by progress in understanding the mechanisms by which
language affects these processes. One puzzle is how effects of language can be both deep,
in the sense of affecting even basic visual processes, and yet vulnerable to manipulations
such as verbal interference, which can sometimes nullify effects of language. In this paper,
I review some of the evidence for effects of language on cognition and perception, showing
that performance on tasks that have been presumed to be non-verbal is rapidly modulated
by language. I argue that a clearer understanding of the relationship between language and
cognition can be achieved by rejecting the distinction between verbal and non-verbal rep-
resentations and by adopting a framework in which language modulates ongoing cognitive
and perceptual processing in a ﬂexible and task-dependent manner.
Keywords: language and thought, perception, categorization, labels, top-down effects, linguistic relativity,Whorf
INTRODUCTION
Are the faculties of perception, categorization, and memory –
capacities humans share with other animals – shaped by the
human-speciﬁc faculty of language?Does language simply allowus
to communicate about our experiences, albeit with much greater
ﬂexibility compared to other animal communication systems? Or,
does language also transform cognition and perception, allow-
ing humans to access and manipulate mental representations
in novel ways? This question has been of longstanding inter-
est to philosophers (see Lee, 1996 for a historical review), and
goes to the core of understanding human cognition (Carruthers,
2002; Spelke, 2003). Many have speculated on the transforma-
tive power of language on cognition (James, 1890; Whorf, 1956;
Cassirer, 1962; Vygotsky, 1962; Dennett, 1994; Clark, 1998). A
growing number of studies show that language can exert rapid
and pervasive effects on putatively non-verbal processes. For con-
temporary reviews of the “language and thought debate” (see
Gumperz and Levinson, 1996; Gentner and Goldin-Meadow,
2003; Gleitman and Papafragou, 2005; Casasanto, 2008; Borodit-
sky, 2010; Wolff and Holmes, 2011). Despite progress on the
empirical front showing apparent effects of language in domains
ranging from basic perceptual tasks such as color perception
(see below), motion perception (Meteyard et al., 2007), visual
search (Lupyan, 2008a), and simple visual detection (Lupyan
and Spivey, 2010a), to categorization in infancy (e.g., Waxman
and Markow, 1995) and adulthood (Lupyan et al., 2007), to
recognition memory (e.g., Lupyan, 2008b; Fausey and Borodit-
sky, 2011) and relational thinking (Loewenstein and Gentner,
2005), there has been a lack in progress on the theoretical front.
In this work, I will argue that signiﬁcant theoretical progress
can be made by taking a interactive-processing perspective (e.g.,
McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981) on the question of the relation-
ship between language and thought.
The paper is divided into four parts: First, I discuss an apparent
paradox that has stymied both critics and proponents of the “lan-
guage and thought” research program (Gleitman and Papafragou,
2005; Wolff and Holmes, 2011): how can effects of labels be both
deep, apparently affecting basic even perceptual processing, and
yet be easily disrupted by manipulations such as verbal interfer-
ence? Second, I present a proposed solution to the paradox in the
form of the label-feedback hypothesis, on which the classic dis-
tinction between verbal and non-verbal processes is replaced with
an emphasis on the role of language as a modulator of a distrib-
uted and interactive system (see also Kemmerer, 2010). Third, I
review some empirical data from the domains of visual percep-
tion, categorization, and memory, that are difﬁcult to reconcile
with common assumptions in contemporary literature on lan-
guage and thought, but are naturally accommodated by the label-
feedback hypothesis. Finally, I brieﬂy discuss the implications
of taking an interactive-processing on the question of linguistic
relativity.
THE FRAGILITY OF LINGUISTIC EFFECTS ON COGNITION AND
PERCEPTION: A PARADOX?
One domain that has received a considerable amount of attention
in the language and thought literature is that of putative effects
of language on color categorization and color perception. Shortly
after the posthumous publication of Benjamin LeeWhorf ’s essays
(Whorf, 1956), the philosopher Max Black published a critique
in which he commented on Whorf ’s now-famous passage: “We
dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.
Language is not simply a reporting device for experience but a
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deﬁning framework for it.” (p. 213). Black remarked that Whorf ’s
word-choice engendered confusion:
“To dissect a frog is to destroy it, but talk about the rainbow
leaves it unchanged. The case would be different if it could
be shown that color vocabularies inﬂuence the perception of
colors, but where is the evidence for that?” (Black, 1959, p.
231).
There is now a large and rapidly increasing number of ﬁnd-
ings showing just such effects: cross-linguistic differences in color
vocabularies can cause differences in color categorization with
concomitant effects on color memory and, indeed, color percep-
tion (Davies and Corbett, 1998; Davidoff et al., 1999; Roberson
et al., 2005, 2008; Daoutis et al., 2006;Winawer et al., 2007; Thierry
et al., 2009). For example,Winawer et al. (2007) presented English
andRussian speakers with color swatches showing different shades
of blue. Russian, unlike English, lexicalizes the category blue with
two basic-level terms: “siniy” for darker blues and “goluboy” for
lighter blues1. The subjects were asked to perform a simultaneous
xAB task, deciding as quickly as possible whether a top color (x)
exactly matched a color on its left (A) or on its right (B). The cat-
egorical relationship between the color x and the non-matching
color was varied such that, for Russian speakers, the two colors
were sometimes in the same lexical category and sometimes in
different categories. All colors were in the “blue” category for Eng-
lish speakers. The results showed a categorical perception effect
for Russian speakers only, as evidenced by slower reaction times
(RTs) on within-category than between-category trials.
A possible mechanism by which cross-linguistic differences in
categorical color perception can be produced is gradual perceptual
warping caused by learning. On this account, long-term experi-
ence categorizing the color spectrum using language gradually
warps the perceptual representations of color resulting in more
similar representations of colors in the same category (i.e., those
labeled by a common term) and/or less similar representations of
colors grouped into distinct categories (i.e., those labeled by dis-
tinct terms). That is, learning and using words such as “siniy” and
“goluboy”provides categorization practice that results in the grad-
ual representational separation of the parts of the color spectrum
to which the labels are applied. Different labeling patterns (using
the generic term “blue”) are therefore predicted to produce dif-
ferent patterns of discrimination across the color spectrum. This
standard account of learned categorical perception (Goldstone,
1994, 1998; Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998) has been applied to the
color domain, and as predicted, training individuals on a new color
boundary can induce categorical perception (Ozgen and Davies,
2002).
On the perceptual learning account, once labels have provided
sufﬁcient categorization training for perceptual warping to occur,
the warped perceptual space remains. And yet, a growing number
1There has been some confusion regarding the primacy of color terms such as
“navy” in English. The crucial cross-linguistic difference here lies not so much in
the frequency, ambiguity, or accessibility of the term“siniy” in the minds of Russian
speakers versus the term“navy” in the minds of English speakers. Rather, the differ-
ence lies in the presence of a generic term “blue” in English and the lack of such a
term in Russian. An inverse situation occurs in the domain of body part terms: The
Russian word “ruka” (arm including the hand) has no corresponding generic term
in English.
of studies show that when participants are placed under con-
ditions of verbal interference that is presumed to decrease the
on-line inﬂuence of language, cross-linguistic differences seem to
disappear. For example, Winawer et al. (2007) found that when
Russian-speaking subjects were placed under verbal interference,
within-category comparisons no longer took longer than between-
category comparisons2 (see also Roberson and Davidoff, 2000;
Pilling et al., 2003; Gilbert et al., 2006; Drivonikou et al., 2007;
Wiggett andDavies, 2008; cf.Witzel andGegenfurtner, 2011). This
bleaching effect of verbal interference is seen in other domains
as well. For example, English and Indonesian-speaking mono-
linguals show memory patterns consistent with their language:
better memory for different tenses in English than Indonesian,
which does not require morphological tense markers (Boroditsky,
2003). The difference inmemory between Indonesian and English
speakers was attenuated with verbal interference.
Further evidence of the transient nature of effects of lan-
guage on cognition comes from studies of the consequences of
language impairments on putatively non-verbal processes (puta-
tive in the sense that if some cognitive process can be shown to
be affected by language, is that process still non-verbal?). The
logic as articulated by Goldstein (1924/1948) is that if language
is involved in not only communicating thoughts but somehow
“ﬁxating” them, then language impairments should produce cog-
nitive impairments. Indeed, as noted by Goldstein (see Noppeney
and Wallesch, 2000 for review), individuals with aphasia appear
to have a number of deﬁcits that appear on their surface to have
little to do with language. A particular difﬁculty is posed by cate-
gorization tasks requiring grouping on a particular dimension. In
an effort to further distil this deﬁcit, Cohen and colleagues con-
cluded that “. . .aphasics have a defect in the analytical isolation of
single features of concepts”(Cohen et al., 1980, 1981), yet are equal
to control subjects “when judgment can be based on global com-
parison” (Cohen et al., 1980). In their examination of the anomic
patient LEW,Davidoff and Roberson reached a similar conclusion,
arguing that when a grouping task requires attention to one cate-
gorywhile abstracting over others, LEW is“without names to assist
the categorical solution.” (Davidoff and Roberson, 2004, p. 166).
In a recent study designed to examine the categorization-aphasia
linkmore exhaustively, Lupyan andMirman (under review) found
that a group of patients with aphasia (selected on the basis of
having varying levels of naming impairments) were speciﬁcally
impaired on a categorization task requiring focusing on a speciﬁc
dimension, e.g., selecting all the pictures of red objects from color
images of familiar objects. The patients were selectively impaired
on trials requiring categorizing by speciﬁc isolated dimensions,
but had performance similar to controls on trials which required
more global categorization such selecting objects typically found
in a laundry room. Critically, the patients’ impairment on this
non-verbal task was best predicted by their performance on a
standard confrontation naming test (PNT; Roach et al., 1996).
Naming performance continued to predict categorization perfor-
mance controlling for semantic impairments and general location
2Verbal interference actually reversed the usual categorical perception effect with
within-category matching now taking less time than between-category matching
(see also Gilbert et al., 2006 for a similar reversal). This odd pattern of results awaits
an explanation.
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of the lesion. These data do not suggest that successful categoriza-
tion depends on an intact naming abilities, but that the two are
intertwined such that naming impairments contribute to catego-
rization impairments, particularly when the task requires isolating
speciﬁc dimensions and cannot be accomplished through overall
similarity3.
Convergent evidence for the interactive relationship between
language and categorization comes from a study in which I used
verbal interference to attempt to simulate some of the catego-
rization impairments that have been previously reported to be
concomitant with naming impairments. Lupyan (2009) tested col-
lege undergraduates on an odd-one-out task in which participants
were presented with triads of pictures or words and had to select
the one that did not belong on some speciﬁc criterion, such as real-
world size. On other trials, the task required selecting a picture or
word that did not belong based on more thematic or functional
relationship.
When tested with this task, the anomic patient LEW was selec-
tively impaired inmaking size and color,but not function/thematic
judgments (Experiment 7,Davidoff and Roberson, 2004). Healthy
subjects undergoing verbal (but not visual) interference of the
same type as used to bleach effects of language on color percep-
tion, showed a performance proﬁle very similar to that of the
anomic patient LEW.
THE PARADOX DISTILLED
The paradox then is this: if effects of language on perceptual pro-
cessing are “Whorﬁan” in the sense of changing the underlying
perceptual space (i.e.,warping perception), then how can the space
be “unwarped” so easily? Similarly, if language affects categoriza-
tion by providing additional training opportunities, why would
language impairments produce categorization impairments? In a
recent debate hosted by The Economist on the proposition “The
language we speak shapes how we think,” Lila Gleitman remarked
on the interpretation of the types of effects of language on color
discussed above with the following observation:
. . .here is the usual ﬁnding: “Disrupting people’s ability to
use language while they are making colour judgments elim-
inates the cross-linguistic differences.” What is puzzling is
why [Boroditsky] thinks this is a “pro” argument. In fact, it is
the“con”argument,namely that the underlying structure and
content of “thought”and“perception”are unaltered by palpa-
ble and general differences in language encoding (Gleitman,
2010).
This argument in one form or another has been invoked by a
number of critics (Gleitman and Papafragou, 2005; Dessalegn and
3Kemmerer et al. (2010) tested a large and very diverse group of brain-damaged
patients on a battery of tasks including naming, word–picture matching, and
attribute selection (e.g., deciding which picture depicts an action that is most tir-
ing). The deﬁcit proﬁle was a complex one with patients showing virtually every
pattern of dissociation between the tasks. Interestingly, naming performance was
signiﬁcantly correlated with performance on the picture-attribute task, but not at
all with the picture-comparison task. It remains to be determined if these patterns
of association reﬂect differences in the degree to which the tasks require selection
of speciﬁc dimensions versus reliance on global association (Lupyan, 2009; Lupyan
et al., under review; see also Sloutsky, 2010).
Landau, 2008; Li et al., 2009). The reasoning seems to be that
if linguistic inﬂuences on categorization and perception can be
removed so easily (or conversely, appear after only a brief training
period, e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; cf. January and Kako, 2007), then
they must be superﬁcial. Put another way, according to this cri-
tique, if an inﬂuence of language on, for example, color perception
can be disrupted via a verbalmanipulation,does this notmean that
language was affecting a verbal process all along and therefore the
effect is of language on language rather than language on per-
ception? This rationale appears to rest on two assumptions: First,
language is assumed to be a medium (a “transparent medium”
even, H. Gleitman et al., 2004, p. 363). On this view, words map
onto concepts, which are, by deﬁnition, independent of words
(e.g., Gopnik, 2001; Snedeker and Gleitman, 2004; Gleitman and
Papafragou, 2005). The second assumption is of a strict separa-
tion between verbal and non-verbal processing, and consequently
between verbal and non-verbal representations. (This assumption
is also evident in the “thinking for speaking” framework artic-
ulated by Slobin, 1996). Accepting these two assumptions, it is
indeed puzzling how the sorts of effects of language on color cate-
gorization and perception discussed above can be simultaneously
pervasive and fragile: if language alters concepts, should not these
altered concepts persist regardless of how language is deployed
on-line?
The label-feedback hypothesis is an attempt to reconcile this
apparent paradox of how effects of language can be so vulnerable
to interference while at the same time exerting apparently perva-
sive inﬂuence on basic perceptual processing (e.g., see Liu et al.,
2009; Thierry et al., 2009; Mo et al., 2011 for effects of language
on early visual processing in the domain of color perception).
As I will argue, the reason these effects are sensitive to manipu-
lations such as verbal interference is that many language exerts
effects on perception by modulating ongoing perceptual process-
ing on-line. This modulation, insofar as it is rapid and automatic,
constitutes a change in the functional structure and content of
“thought” referred to by Gleitman because language and thought
are part of a distributed interactive system.As articulated byWhorf
himself:
Any activations [of the] processes and linkages [which consti-
tute] the structure of a particular language. . . once incorpo-
rated into the brain [are] all linguistic patterning operations,
and all entitled to be called thinking (Whorf, 1937, pp. 57–58
cited in Lee, 1996, p. 54).
A note of caution is in order: Viewing language as a part of an
inherently interactive system with the capacity to augment pro-
cessing in a range of non-linguistic tasks does not mean that
performance on every task or representations of every concept
are under linguistic control. Rather, the argument is that learning
and using a system as ubiquitous as language has the potential to
affect performance on a verywide range of tasks.A fruitful research
strategy may be therefore to investigate what classes of seemingly
non-verbal tasks are inﬂuenced by language (and which are not),
and on what classes of tasks cross-linguistic differences yield con-
sistent differences in performance. This point is expanded below
in the Section “Implication of the Label-Feedback Hypothesis for
‘Language and Thought’ Research Program.”
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FROM PERCEPTION TO CATEGORIZATION TO VERBAL
LABELS AND BACK AGAIN: THE LABEL-FEEDBACK
HYPOTHESIS
Perceiving a stimulus as meaningful depends on (perhaps even
requires) representing the stimulus in terms of a larger class. Con-
sider that even a task as simple as deciding whether two“identical”
objects, presented simultaneously in different locations are the
“same” requires the observer to ignore that they are different by
virtue of their positions. In the short-story Funes the Memorius,
Borges describes a man incapable of categorization:
“It was not only difﬁcult for him to understand that the
generic term dog embraced so many unlike specimens of dif-
fering sizes and different forms; he was disturbed by the fact
that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in proﬁle) should have the
same name as the dog at three-ﬁfteen (seen from the front)”
(Borges, 1942/1999, p. 136).
Naming both of the above instances of dogs as a “dog” requires
representing both as members of the same class – one which
is associated with the label “dog.” Clearly, naming depends on
categorization. But does language, and the act of naming in par-
ticular, play an active role in the categorization process itself? In
this section, I argue that names (verbal labels) play an active role in
perception and categorization by selectively activating perceptual
features that are diagnostic of the category being labeled. Critically,
although this top-down augmentation of perceptual representa-
tions by language is likely to be in play, to some degree, even during
passive vision, it can be up- or down-regulated through linguistic
manipulations such as brief verbal training/verbal priming and
verbal interference.
On the present view, categorization is the process by which
detectably different (i.e., non-identical) stimuli come to be repre-
sented as identical, in some respect (see Lupyan et al., under review
for discussion). Categorizing a stimulus thus involves changing
its representation. However, placing two objects into the same
category does not, logically, imply a change to their perceptual
representations which on some accounts are impenetrable to
the inﬂuence of conceptual categories (e.g., see Pylyshyn, 1999;
Macpherson, 2012). In groundbreaking work, Goldstone and col-
leagues (Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone and Hendrickson, 2010 for
review) showed that the categorization process alters perception
itself. In a typical study, participants were trained to respond to
items that parametrically vary on one or more dimensions with
some belonging to“CategoryA”and others to“Category B”(Gold-
stone, 1994), or to discriminate between individuals belonging to
a “club” and those not belonging (Goldstone et al., 2003). Follow-
ing this training, visual discrimination ability is assessed (while
controlling for effects of categorization from those of mere expo-
sure4) and compared to visual discrimination prior to training or
to discrimination following a control training task. A signiﬁcant
change in the perception of dimensions relevant to the categoriza-
tion task suggests that categorization experience altered the visual
appearance of the items being categorized. Rather than just being
mediated by the category responses (i.e., participants judging two
4See Folstein et al. (2010) for a recent study of the role of mere exposure to exemplars
on subsequent category learning.
stimuli as more similar by virtue of their belonging to the same
category), the experience of categorization was found to warp per-
ception, sensitizing some regions of perceptual space (e.g., those
close to the category boundary; Goldstone, 1994). This warping
effect affected the relationship between trained and novel stimuli–
an effect argued by the authors to be incompatible with an effect
of categorization on the decision process only (Goldstone et al.,
2001).
Goldstone and colleagues’ work on perceptual warping and
learned categorical perception (e.g., Goldstone et al., 2001) pro-
vides a potential mechanism by which language may augment
categorization. Because each act of naming is an act of catego-
rization, learning to label some colors “green” and others “blue,”
provide a type of category-training which, over time, is expected
to help pull apart the representations and resulting in decreased
representational overlap between the two classes of stimuli. But
how can one reconcile the perceptual warping process with the
fragility of language-modulated effects outlined above?
The label-feedback hypothesis proposes that language produces
transient modulation of ongoing perceptual (and higher-level)
processing. In the case of color, this means that after learning that
certain colors are called “green,” the perceptual representations
activated by a green-colored object become warped by top-down
feedback as the verbal label “green” is co-activated. This results in
a temporary warping of the perceptual space with greens pushed
closer together and/or greens being dragged further from non-
greens. Viewing a green object becomes a hybrid visuo-linguistic
experience. Knowing that some colors are called green means that
our everyday experiences of seeing become affected by the verbal
term, which in turn makes the visual representation more cat-
egorical. This modulation can be increased – up-regulated – by
activating the label to a greater than normal degree as when a
participant hears a verbal label prior to seeing a visual display.
Conversely, verbal interference is one way to down-regulate the
activation of labels leading to reduced inﬂuences effect of language
on “non-verbal” processing.
To illustrate how language can affect perceptual representa-
tions, consider a task in which subjects view brieﬂy presented
displays of the numerals 2 and 5, with several from each cate-
gory presented simultaneously. The task is to attend to just the 5s
and to press a button as soon as a small dot appears around one of
the numerals. The more selectively participants can attend to the
5s, and just the 5s, the better they ought to perform. Before some
trials, participants actually hear the word “ﬁve.” This cue consti-
tutes entirely redundant information because participants already
know what they should do on each trial. The task of attending to
the 5s remains constant for the entire 45-min experiment, thus the
word“ﬁve”tells themnothing they do not already know.Yet, on the
randomly intermixed trials on which they actually hear the word,
participants respond more quickly (and, depending on the task,
more accurately; Lupyan and Spivey, 2010b). This type of facilita-
tionoccurs evenwhen the items are seen for only 100ms,a time too
brief to permit eye movements. Similar effects are obtained with
more complex items such as pictures of chairs and tables. The lin-
guistic facilitation is also transient. If too much time is allowed to
elapse between the label and the onset of the display (more than
∼1600ms. in this case), no facilitation is seen. In fact, obtaining
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such effects is only possible if hearing a word has a transient effect
on visual processing; if the facilitation due to hearing a word car-
ried through the entire experiment, the difference between the
intermixed label and no-label trials would quickly vanish. Yet the
difference persisted, in most cases through the entire experiment
lasting for hundreds of trials (Lupyan and Spivey, 2010b) which
was only possible if hearing a label affected perceptual processing
in a transient, on-line manner.
According to the label-feedback hypothesis, hearing the word
“ﬁve” activates visual features corresponding to 5s, transiently
moving the representations of 5s and 2s further apart, while
making the perceptual representations of the various 5s on the
screen more similar, and thereby easier to simultaneously attend.
Notice that this task did not require identiﬁcation or naming. Ver-
bal labels were certainly not needed to see that 2s and 5s are
perceptually different. Yet, overt language use – a hypothesized
“up-regulation” of the linguistic modulation normally takes place
during perception – had robust effects on perceptual processing.
In other studies, my colleagues and I have shown that hearing
similarly redundant words can improve performance in a pop-out
visual search (Lupyan, 2008a) and improves search efﬁciency in
more difﬁcult search tasks (Lupyan, 2007). Hearing a label can
even make an invisible object visible. Lupyan and Spivey (2010a)
showed that hearing a spoken label increased visual sensitivity (i.e.,
increased the d ′) in a simple object detection task: simply hear-
ing a label enabled participants to detect the presence of brieﬂy
presented masked objects which were otherwise invisible (see also
Ward and Lupyan, 2011 who showed that hearing labels can make
visible stimuli suppressed through continuous ﬂash suppression).
A SIMPLE MODEL OF ON-LINE LINGUISTIC EFFECTS ON
PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS
A simple model implementing the idea of labels as modulators
of lower-level representations is shown in Figure 1. The model is
implemented as a fully recurrent neural network (Rumelhart et
al., 1986). Solid lines denote feedforward connections and dashed
lines denote feedback connections. In this implementation, the
perceptual layer is providedwith a feature-based input of a current
object. Themodel is trained on two categories instantiated as a dis-
tortion from one of two category prototypes (for a more detailed
description, see Lupyan, in press). Let us arbitrarily call one cat-
egory “chairs” and the other “tables.” During training, the model
learns to produce names, e.g., to produce the label “chair” given
one of the chairs, and comprehend names: given the label “chair,”
it activates properties characteristic of chairs. Due to the one-to-
many mapping between-category labels and category exemplars
the network cannot knowwhich particular object is being referred
to when presented with just the category label. It is this one-to-
many mapping that allows the network to generalize and make
inferences to un-seen properties. Because some properties (e.g.,
having a back) are more closely correlated with category mem-
bership than other properties (e.g., being brown) the category
labels become more strongly associated with properties that are
typical or diagnostic of the denoted category, and dissociated from
properties that are not diagnostic of the category.
Following this training, we can examine what happens to rep-
resentations of category exemplars when the label is allowed to
FIGURE 1 | A schematic of a neural network architecture for exploring
on-line effects of labels on perceptual representations. See text for
description.
feed back on the activity in the perceptual layers. Figure 2 shows a
principal-components analysis (PCA) of the perceptual represen-
tations of exemplars from two categories learned in the context
of labels. In Figure 2A, the label is endogenous to the network.
The network produces the label itself in response to the percep-
tual input, and the label is then allowed to feedback to affect the
visual representations. This corresponds to what is hypothesized
to occur in the default case: perceptual representations are modu-
lated on-line by verbal labels via top-down feedback. In Figure 2B
the labels are prevented from affecting the representations on-line
by disabling the name-to-hidden-layer connections. The cate-
gory separation observed in this PCA plot is due entirely from
bottom-up perceptual differences between the two categories. This
situation is logically equivalent to a verbal interference condi-
tion (although in reality, label activations are only one kind of
top-down inﬂuences affecting visual processing). In Figure 2C
the labels are provided exogenously to the network along with
the perceptual input. This case is equivalent to the label trials
in the experiment described above (Lupyan and Spivey, 2010b).
Much clearer category separation is observed. Insofar as correct
categorizationdependson representing similarities between exem-
plars, it is facilitated by the inﬂuence of labels. There is a cost to
this enhanced categorization. The more categorical representa-
tions produced by the labels are beneﬁcial for categorization-type
tasks,but reduce accuracy in the representationof the idiosyncratic
properties of individual exemplars. Indeed, when participants are
shown pictures of chairs and tables and are asked to label some
of them with the category labels (“chair” and “table”), they show
poorer subsequent recognition of items that they labeled (Lupyan,
2008b).
The simple model shown in Figure 1 can be extended to help
understand how label-feedback may affect performance in cate-
gorization tasks such as those requiring the isolation of speciﬁc
dimensions – impaired in aphasia and under conditions of ver-
bal interference. Feedback from the activation of a dimensional
label such as “size” or “color” is predicted to have the same kind
of cohering effect – facilitating the grouping of objects by their
dimensions. This role of labels in realigning representations is one
way to explain the facilitatory effect of labels in relational reason-
ing (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Ratterman and Gentner, 1998;
Gentner and Loewenstein, 2002).
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FIGURE 2 | Principal-components analyses from a connectionist
simulation showing the influence of category labels on the
perceptual representations.The simulation uses the network
architecture shown in Figure 1. Each dot represents an item from one
of two categories, denoted by separate colors and its location. Category
structure is enhanced when labels, activated by the network, are
allowed to feed back onto the perceptual layer (A). When this feedback
of labels is disrupted by blocking the ﬂow of activity from the label to
the hidden layer, representations revert to reﬂecting the perceptual
structure of the stimulus space (B). Categorization is further enhanced
when the label is provided to the network exogenously (C). See text for
additional details.
ON-LINE VERSUS SUSTAINED EFFECTS OF LABELS ON
PERCEPTION AND COGNITION
The demonstrations of the effects of labels on perceptual processes
discussed above focused on transient effects such as those pro-
duced by overtly hearing a category name. Finding that language
inﬂuences visual processing, but only in the few seconds imme-
diately after we hear a word, while curious, is clearly of limited
theoretical import. The key assumption in such experiments (e.g.,
Lupyan, 2007, 2008a; Lupyan and Spivey, 2010a,b) is that overt
presentation of labels (or, as shown by Lupyan and Swingley, in
press, language production in the formof self-directed speech) can
exaggerate what is hypothesized to be the normal on-line inﬂuence
of language on task performance.Verbal interference, on this view,
is a comparable down-regulation of language. Suchmanipulations
can shed light on the“normal” function played by language in cog-
nition andperception. In this section I brieﬂy review someﬁndings
suggesting that perceptual processes are inﬂuenced rapidly and
automatically by language. That is, the normal state in adults
is closer to Figure 2A in which automatically activated labels
modulated perceptual representations, than Figure 2B in which
perceptual representations mapped onto category labels, but were
impermeable to linguistic feedback.
Consider a task in which an observer is presented with two
stimuli and needs to determine, as quickly as possible, whether
they are visually identical. Naturally, the more subtle the differ-
ences, the more difﬁcult the judgment. Consider now the letter
pairs B-b and B-p. The letters in each pair are visually equidistant,
but conceptually B-b are more similar than B-p. Despite this con-
ceptual difference, reaction times (RTs) for B-p and B-b judgments
are equivalent when the two letters are presented simultaneously
(Lupyan, 2008a). However, when the second letter is presented
≥150ms. after the ﬁrst (with the ﬁrst still present on the screen),B-
b judgments become more difﬁcult than B-p judgments (Lupyan
et al., 2010b). We claimed this occurs because during this delay,
the representation of the ﬁrst letter becomes augmented by its
conceptual category, rendering “B” more similar to “b” and more
distinct from “p.” This effect is further enhanced when subjects
actually hear the letter name (Lupyan, 2008a), i.e., up-regulating
language appears to exaggerate the categorical perception effect.
Although these results show basic perception to be dynamically
inﬂuenced by conceptual categories, the results do not directly
address the role played speciﬁcally by the category names. This
question is beginning to be addressed using the work described
below.
Using fMRI, Tan et al. (2008) showed that in a same-different
color discrimination task, similar to the simultaneous condition
of the B-p task described above,Wernicke’s area (posterior part of
BA 22) showed greater activity for easy-to-name versus hard-to-
name colors suggesting its automatic activation in this non-verbal
task. Although the authors attempted to interpret the selective
activity in terms of the effects of language on visual discrimina-
tion, clearly, no such causal attribution of the neural activity can
be made; its activity may be consistent with activation of color
names, but does not indicate that this activity affects visual pro-
cessing.On the current account, such causal effects are exactlywhat
is expected,with category effects in vision emerging (in some part)
due to activation of category names. One way to test this predic-
tion is by disrupting the activity and measuring its outcome. In a
recent study,we administeredTMS toWernicke’s areawhile partic-
ipants performed theB-p/B-b same-different task (Lupyan et al., in
preparation). Insofar as slower responses to B-b relative to B-p are
the result of label-feedback, disrupting this activity should elim-
inate the RT difference between B-p and B-b stimuli. The results
showed that an inhibitory stimulation regime completely elimi-
nated the RT difference between responding“different” to B-p and
B-b letter pairs. Control stimulation to the vertex had no effect.
To my knowledge, no theory of visual processing classiﬁes Wer-
nicke’s area (posterior superior temporal gyrus) as “visual.” That
disruption of activity in this region alters behavioral responses
on a visual task supports the hypothesis that the effects of con-
ceptual categories (here, letter categories) on visual processing are
subserved in part by a classic language area, stimulation of which
possibly disrupts its usual modulation of neighboring posterior
regions of the ventral visual pathway.
The transient effects of labels on perception described above
may be special cases of normally occurring top-downmodulations
of vision by linguistic, contextual and other “cognitive” factors. An
example of such modulations of a more sustained nature can be
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seen when one examines the role of meaningfulness in vision. As
might be expected, it is easier to recognize and discriminatemean-
ingful entities than meaningless ones. For example, it takes about
200ms. longer to recognize that the items in the pair / are phys-
ically identical than it does to make the same judgment for /
or / (Lupyan, 2008a). The stimuli and differ in meaningful-
ness, of course, but they also differ in familiarity. We simply have
more experience processing s as compared with s. In a very
simple study, Lupyan and Spivey (2008) used a visual search task
in which participants were asked to search for a among s (or
vice-versa). The stimuli were meaningless and perceptually novel.
Some participants were explicitly told at the start of the experi-
ment that the shapes should be thought of as rotated 2 and 5s.
This simple instruction dramatically improved overall RTs and led
to shallower search slopes, indicatingmore efﬁcient visual process-
ing. The effect of construing a stimulus as meaningful (and in this
case, associating it with a named category) produced a sustained
effect in the sense that once induced, the facilitation persists, an
effect reminiscent of the well-known hiddenDalmatian in a piece-
meal image, which once known to be present in the image, cannot
be“un-seen”(Gregory, 1970; see also Porter, 1954). Arguably, such
effects are also on-line effects (see also Bentin and Golland, 2002).
The degree to which such conceptual effects on visual processing
are truly linguistic requires further investigation and neurostim-
ulation techniques such as TMS and tDCS will potentially prove
useful (Lupyan et al., 2010a).
These results potentially inform the ﬁndings of cross-linguistic
differences in early ERPs in response to changing colors. Thierry
et al. (2009) found that Greek speakers who, like Russian speak-
ers, have separate words for light and dark blues, showed a
greater visual mismatch negativity – an early component show-
ing condition-differences starting at ∼160ms that has been used
to index automatic, and arguably preattentive change detection –
whenpresentedwith color changes that spanned the lexical bound-
ary. The authors found some differences in the P1 component as
well. On the one hand, such differences in early visual processing
may be viewed as consequences of long-term perceptual warping
produced by language (or perhaps other cultural factors). This
account however, would be at a loss to explain why in other stud-
ies verbal interference can eliminate cross-linguistic differences on
behavioralmeasures of categorical color perception.An alternative
account is that viewing colors automatically activates their names
that warp perceptual representations on-line. The observed effects
on early perception are thus evidence not of a permanent change in
bottom-up processing, but rather of a sustained top-down mod-
ulation possibly induced by activation of the color names during
the task5.
THE NEURAL PLAUSIBILITY OF LANGUAGE-MODULATED
PERCEPTION
Understanding the word “chair” is clearly a more complex process
than detecting the presence of a shape in a visual display or
5The authors did not test whether linguistic manipulations such as verbal inter-
ference reduce or eliminate the cross-linguistic difference in the visual mismatch
negativity, although in a commentary they admit that this would be a natural
followup (Athanasopoulos et al., 2009).
determining which of two color swatches matches a third. How
can a complex “high-level” process inﬂuence low-level and much
more rapid processes such as simple detection? This would indeed
be puzzling if the brain were a feedforward system. It is not. Neural
processing is intrinsically interactive (Mesulam, 1998; Freeman,
2001). As eloquently argued in a prescient paper by Churchland
et al. (1994), the brain is only grossly hierarchical: sensory input
signals are only a part of what drives“sensory”neurons, processing
stages are not like assembly line productions, and later processing
can inﬂuence earlier processing (p. 59). This view has in recent
years received overwhelming support (e.g., Mumford, 1992; Rao
and Ballard, 1999; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Foxe and Simp-
son, 2002; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Gilbert and Sigman, 2007;
Kveraga et al., 2007; Mesulam, 2008; Koivisto et al., 2011).
To give two examples from vision of gross violations of hier-
archical processing: (1) the “late” prefrontal areas of cortex can
at times respond to the presence of a visual stimulus before early
visual cortex (V2; LammeandRoelfsema,2000 for review). (2)The
well-known classical receive ﬁelds of V1 neurons showing orienta-
tion tuning appear to be dynamically reshaped by horizontal and
top-down processes. Within 100ms. after stimulus onset, V1 neu-
rons are re-tuned from reﬂecting simple orientation features, to
representing ﬁgure/ground relationships over amuch larger visual
angle (Olshausen et al., 1993; Lamme et al., 1999).
Effects of verbal labels on vision can be seen as embodying
a similar, but more complex type of perceptual modulation as
the reshaping of V1 receptive ﬁelds. Although the neural loci
of these effects are at present unknown, one possibility is that
processing an object name initiates a volley of feedback activity
to object-selective regions of cortex such as IT (Logothetis and
Sheinberg, 1996), producing a predictive signal or “head start”
to the visual system (Kveraga et al., 2007; Esterman and Yantis,
2008; Puri and Wojciulik, 2008). On several theories of attention
(e.g., biased competition theory of Desimone and Duncan, 1995),
these predictive signals would enable neurons that respond to the
named object to gain a competitive advantage (see alsoVecera and
Farah, 1994; Kramer et al., 1997; Deco and Lee, 2002; Kravitz and
Behrmann, 2008). Given feedback from object-selective cortical
regions, winning objects can bias earlier spatial regions of visual
cortex.
LABELS AND STIMULUS TYPICALITY
The two-dimensional projection of the perceptual representations
shown in Figure 2 hides an interesting interaction between labels
and stimulus typicality. Not surprisingly, the network shows basic
typicality effects. The correct category label is more quickly and/or
strongly activated when the network is presented with a more typ-
ical item (i.e., an item having more typical values on dimensions
learned by the network to be important). The somewhat counter-
intuitive consequence is that it is these already typical items that
are most affected by labels: the items tend to become even more
typical as the network ﬁlls in undeﬁned or unknown features with
category-typical values. The atypical exemplars (i.e., instances on
the periphery of the category), although having the most potential
to be affected by the label, interact with the label more weakly than
the more central exemplars. One can visualize this effect using a
magnet metaphor: an object positioned far from a magnet can
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be moved a greater distance than an object positioned close to
the magnet, but because the magnetic ﬁeld drops off rapidly with
increasing distance, the object farther away is being pulled only
weakly and may not move at all. Such a mechanism has similar-
ities to the perceptual magnet effect in perception of phonemes
(Kuhl, 1994) and the attractor ﬁeld model in visual perception
(e.g., Tanaka and Corneille, 2007).
Effects of typicality turn out to be quite pervasive: In visual
tasks, up-regulating the effect of labels through overt presentation
of the label beneﬁts typical category members more than atypi-
cal ones. Effects of labels on perceptual processing appear to be
stronger for more typical exemplars. For instance, the effect of
hearing a label is strong for a numeral in a typical font (5), com-
pared to when it was rendered in a less typical font ( ; Lupyan,
2007; Lupyan and Spivey, 2010b). In the recognition memory task
described above (Lupyan, 2008b) it labeling the typical exemplars
led to poorermemorywhereas labeling atypical exemplars did not.
As a further demonstration that processing an item in the context
of its name activates a more typical representation, consider the
following two results:
(1) In Experiment 6 of Lupyan (2008b), participants were asked
to rate pictures of chairs and lamps on typicality (from very
typical to very atypical). The pictures were presented, one at
a time, followed by a prompt with the rating scale. The text
of the prompt either mentioned the name of the category by
name (“chair”/“lamp”) or did not (a within-subject manipu-
lation). Participants were instructed to always rate the object’s
typicality with respect to its category. That is, the task was
the same regardless of how the prompt was worded. Yet, par-
ticipants were more likely to rate the same pictures as more
typical when asked, “How typical was that chair” than “How
typical was that object,” rating the already typical objectsmore
typical when referred to by their name (Figure 3).
(2) Categories like chair, although comprising concrete objects,
are rather fuzzy and do not have formal deﬁnitions. In con-
trast, categories like triangle, can be formally deﬁned (Arm-
strong et al., 1983). All triangles are three-sided polygons
and all three-sided polygons are triangles. When queried, all
tested participants (18/18) correctly stated this formal deﬁni-
tion. When tested on a speeded recognition task, participants
showed a typicality/canonicality effect, being faster to recog-
nize isosceles than scalene triangles. This effect, however, was
obtained only on trials when participants were cued with the
word“triangle.”When,on randomly intermixed trials,partici-
pantswere cuedwith thephrase“three sides,”theywere equally
fast to recognize isosceles and scalene triangles. According
to the label-feedback hypothesis, the category label “triangle”
activates a more typical triangle, which in this case appears to
correspond to an isosceles/equilateral triangle with a horizon-
tal base. One interesting prediction is that if the label tends to
activate a canonical triangle, then referring to a non-canonical
triangle explicitly with the word “triangle” may actually alter
judgments of its physical properties. To test this prediction,
participants were asked to estimate the angle of triangles with
a prompt that asked to either estimate the angle of “this tri-
angle” or of “this three-sided ﬁgure” (with the instruction
varying between-subjects). Participants in the triangle con-
dition over-estimated the angle more than participants in
the three-sided condition (Figure 4) – possibly caused by a
contrast effect between the activated canonical (non-rotated)
triangle and the rotated triangle being judged. This difference
persisted for the entire length of the experiment (about 150
trials; Lupyan, 2011; Lupyan et al., in preparation).
THE ROLE OF VERBAL LABELS IN THE LEARNING OF NOVEL
CATEGORIES
The learning of categories is in principle separable from the
learning of their names. A child, for example, can have a con-
ceptual category of “dog” (such that different dogs are reliably
classiﬁed as being the same kinds of thing) without having a
name for the category. In practice, however, the two processes
are intimately linked. Not only does conceptual development
FIGURE 3 | A comparison of typicality ratings of chairs and lamps
when the prompt includes the category name (“chair” or “lamp”) and
when it includes a generic referent (“object”; Lupyan, 2008b,
Experiment 6).The x-axis is the average typicality rank of each picture from
very typical to very atypical.
FIGURE 4 | A comparison of judgments of the base angle relative to
the horizontal of triangles called “triangles” and the same figures
called “three-sided shapes” (Lupyan, 2011).
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shape verbal development (e.g., Snedeker and Gleitman, 2004),
but verbal learning impacts conceptual development (Waxman
andMarkow, 1995; Gumperz and Levinson, 1996; Levinson, 1997;
Spelke and Tsivkin, 2001; Gentner and Goldin-Meadow, 2003;
Yoshida and Smith, 2005; Lupyan et al., 2007). The idea that lan-
guage shapes concepts has two implications. The ﬁrst is that it is
of course through language that we learn much of what we know.
This is often seen as trivial, as when Devitt and Sterelny wrote,
apparently without irony, that “the only respect in which language
clearly and obviously does inﬂuence thought turns out to be rather
banal: language provides us with most of our concepts” (Devitt
and Strelny, 1987, p. 178)6. The second implication is that the very
use of words may facilitate, or in some cases enable, the ability
to impose categories on the external world. Do category names
actually facilitate the learning of novel categories?
In a study designed to answer this question, Lupyan et al.
(2007) compared the ability of participants to learn categories
that were labeled to the learning of the same categories without
names. The basic task required participants to learn to classify
16 “aliens” into those that ought to be approached and those to
be avoided, responding with the appropriate direction of motion
(approach/escape). The category distinction involved subtle dif-
ferences in the conﬁguration of the “head” and “body” of the
creatures. On each training trial, one of the 16 aliens appeared in
the center of the screen andhad tobe categorizedbymoving a char-
acter in a spacesuit (the “explorer”) toward or away from the alien,
with auditory feedback marking the response as correct or not.
In the label conditions, a printed or auditory label (the nonsense
terms, “leebish” and “grecious”) appeared next to the alien; in the
no-label condition, the alien remained on the screen by itself. All
the participants received the same number of categorization trials
and saw the aliens for exactly the sameduration; the only difference
between the groupswas the presence of the category labels that fol-
lowed each response. The labels, being perfectly predictive of the
behavioral responses, constituted entirely redundant information.
The results showed that participants in the label conditions
learned to classify the aliens much faster than those in the no-label
conditions. When the labels were replaced with equally redun-
dant and easily learned non-linguistic and non-referential cues
(corresponding to where the alien lived), the cues failed to facili-
tate categorization. After completing the category-training phase
during which participants in both groups eventually reached ceil-
ing performance, their knowledge of the categories was tested in
a speeded categorization task using a combination of previously
categorized and novel aliens, presented without any feedback or
labels. Results showed that those who learned the categories in the
presence of labels retained their category knowledge throughout
the testing phase. Those who learned the categories without labels
showed a decrease in accuracy over time. Thus, learning named
categories appears to be easier than learning unnamed categories.
More than just learning to map words onto pre-existing concepts
6It is probably too obvious to mention, but this function of language is far from
banal. Consider that in the absence of language, much of what humans need to
learn to survive would have to be learned through slow and dangerous trial and
error (Harnad, 2005). It is not an exaggeration to claim that without the ability to
learn through language human culture would not exist (Deacon, 1997).
(cf. Li and Gleitman, 2002; Snedeker and Gleitman, 2004), words
appear to facilitate the categorization process itself.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LABEL-FEEDBACK HYPOTHESIS FOR
THE “LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT” RESEARCH PROGRAM
Most work investigating the relationship between language, cog-
nition, and perception has assumed that verbal and non-verbal
representations are fundamentally distinct and the goal of the“lan-
guage and thought” research program is to understand whether
and how linguistic representations affect non-linguistic represen-
tations (Wolff and Holmes, 2011). On such a view, information
communicated or encoded via language comprises what is essen-
tially a separate “verbal” modality or channel (Paivio, 1986). Lin-
guistic effects are ascribed either to language inﬂuencing “deep”
non-verbal processes which ought to not be affected by ver-
bal interference or acquired language deﬁcits, or else hinge on
high-level processes that combine verbal and non-verbal input in
some way (e.g., Roberson and Davidoff, 2000; Pilling et al., 2003;
Dessalegn and Landau, 2008; Mitterer et al., 2009). Neither pro-
posed mechanism can explain how language can have pervasive
effects on perceptual processing that are nevertheless permeable to
linguistic manipulations such as verbal interference – the paradox
outlined above.
The label-feedback hypothesis provides a way of resolving the
paradox. Effects of language can indeed run “deep” in the sense
of affecting low-level processes (e.g., Thierry et al., 2009) – the
very processes claimed by Gleitman (2010) to be impervious to
language. Such effects of language on, e.g., color perception need
not arise from language somehow permanently warping percep-
tual space. Thinking of these effects as occurring on-line explains
why they can be modulated by verbal factors such as overt lan-
guage use and verbal interference. Framing effects of language as
occurring on-line does not render them superﬁcial, strategic, or
necessarily under voluntary control (Lupyan and Spivey, 2010a,b;
Lupyan et al., 2010b).On this formulation, the distinction between
verbal and non-verbal representations becomes moot, just as tak-
ing seriously the pervasiveness of top-down effects in perception
renders moot the distinction between “earlier” and “later” cortical
areas (Gilbert and Sigman, 2007).
To return to the case of linguistic effects on color perception:
On the present view, a visual representation of a color, e.g., blue,
becomes rapidly modulated by the activation of the word “blue,”
a process that can be exaggerated by exogenous presentation of
the label and attenuated by manipulations such as verbal interfer-
ence. Thus, although the bottom-up processing of color is likely
to be independent of language and identical in speakers of differ-
ent languages, the top-down effects in which language takes part
are dependent on the word-color associations to which the speak-
ers have been exposed, and will thus be correspondingly different
between speakers who possess a generic term“blue”and those who
do not. Such modulations occur as the label becomes active (over
the course of a few 100ms). There is nothingmysterious about this
process: it is simply the consequence of the idea that visual repre-
sentations involved in making even the simplest visual decisions
are augmented by feedback higher-level, and typically more ante-
rior brain regions. Feedback from language-based activations such
as the activation of the word “green”on seeing green color patches
can be seen as one form of such top-down inﬂuence.
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Although color processing has been a popular testing ground
for exploring effects of language7, the label-feedback hypothe-
sis has a broader relevance. At stake is the question of whether
and to what degree perception of familiar objects is continuously
augmented by the labels that become co-active with perceptual
representations of these objects. This means that once a label is
learned, it can potentially modulate subsequent processing (visual
and otherwise) of objects towhich the label refers. Indeed, the ben-
eﬁts of names in learning novel categories (Lupyan et al., 2007),
may derive, at least in part, from the labels’ effect on perceptual
processing of the exemplars (see also Lupyan and Thompson-
Schill, 2012). Lexicalization patterns differ substantially between
languages (e.g., Bowerman and Choi, 2001; Lucy and Gaskins,
2001; Majid et al., 2007; Evans and Levinson, 2009). Accordingly,
speakers of different languages end up with different patterns
of associations between labels and external objects, resulting in
different top-down effects of language on ongoing “non-verbal”
processing in speakers of different languages.
The label-feedback hypothesis as presented here does not claim
to be relevant to all effects labeled as “Whorﬁan” in the literature.
The most direct application is to the processes of categorization
and object perception. The hypothesis does not predict that any
differences in the grammar of language translate to meaningful
differences in “thought.” A pervasive additional source of con-
fusion in the language and thought literature that I have not
discussed here relates to predicting the consequences that a par-
ticular linguistic difference should have on a particular putatively
non-linguistic task. Consider, for example, the observation that
English verbs highlight the manner of motion (e.g., walk, run,
hop) leaving the path as an option, while Spanish verbs highlight
the path of motion (e.g., entrar, pasar) leaving the manner as an
option (Talmy, 1988). Does the priority of manner information
in English mean that English speakers should have better mem-
ory for manner than Spanish speakers? Perhaps, but one might
just as easily predict the opposite pattern: Spanish speakers ought
to have better memory for manner information because, when it
is mentioned, it is more unexpected and thus more salient (cf.
Gennari et al., 2002; Papafragou et al., 2008). Progress in this area
appears to require a ﬁrmer marriage between memory researchers
and psycholinguists.
More generally, rather than attempting to decide whether a
given representation comprises a verbal or visual “code” (e.g.,
Dessalegn and Landau, 2008), on the current proposal, it may
be more productive to measure the degree to which performance
on speciﬁc tasks is being modulated by language, modulated dif-
ferently by different languages, or is truly independent of any
experimental manipulations that can be termed linguistic. On
this account, the central question is not “do speakers of differ-
ent languages have different color concepts” but rather “how does
language affect the perceptual representations of color brought
7Witzel and Gegenfurtner (2011) present a cogent argument that most recent inves-
tigations of categorical color perception havemade incorrect assumptions regarding
psychophysical distances in the CIE color space, such that color pairs claimed to be
equally spaced in psychophysical space may not be, rendering many of the claims
made by these studies difﬁcult to interpret.
to bear on a given task.” Much of the literature in the language
and thought arena holds an implicit (and sometimes explicit)
assumption that there exists such things as the concept of a dog, or
the concept of green-ness. On this assumption, accepting that the
concept of green-ness is inﬂuenced by language creates the expec-
tation that one should observe those linguistic effects on any task
that taps into that singular color concept. Failure to observe these
effects is then used by as an argument against linguistic relativity or
language-mediated vision. On an alternative view, however, con-
ceptual representations are dynamic assemblies that are a function
of prior knowledge aswell as current task demands (Casasanto and
Lupyan, 2011; Lupyan et al., under review; see also Prinz, 2004).
There is therefore no single concept of green-ness. Rather, the
inﬂuence of language on ongoing cognitive and perceptual pro-
cessing may be present in some tasks and non-existent in others.
For example, given the categorical nature of linguistic reference,
one prediction is that effects of language ought to become stronger
in tasks that require or promote categorization andweaker in tasks
that discourage it (e.g., realistic drawing, remembering exact spa-
tial locations, judging a continuously varying motion trajectory).
By understanding how language may augment speciﬁc cognitive
and perceptual processes,we canmake predictions about the kinds
of tasks should or should not be inﬂuenced by language broadly
construed and by differences between languages.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that a pervasive source of theoretical confusion
regarding effects of language on cognition and perception stems
from a failure to appreciate the degree to which virtually all cogni-
tive and perceptual acts reﬂect interactive-processing, combining
bottom-up and top-down sources of information. An effect of
language on how we perceive the rainbow does not require it to
alter the responses of photoreceptors. A deep and persistent effect
of language on object concepts does not require it to alter concep-
tual “cores” (indeed, the very existence of such conceptual cores
is debatable, Barsalou, 1987; Prinz, 2004; Casasanto and Lupyan,
2011).
Our perception of rainbows, dogs, and everything in between
is a product of both their physical properties and top-down
processes. The idea that words affect ongoing cognitive and per-
ceptual processes via top-down feedback provides a useful way for
thinking about the interaction of language with other processes.
In its present form, the label-feedback hypothesis is merely a
sketch, but as evidenced by some of the studies reviewed in this
paper, this framework provides a powerful intuition pump for
generating testable predictions. The label-feedback hypothesis is
broadly consistent with what we know about neural mechanisms
of perception and categorization, although its neural underpin-
nings remain almost completely unexplored. The next step is to
understand these mechanisms.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Portions of thismanuscript appeared in Lupyan (2007).The Label-
Feedback Hypothesis: Linguistic Inﬂuences on Visual Processing.
PhD. Thesis. Carnegie Mellon University, during which time the
author was supported by an NSF Graduate fellowship.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition March 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 54 | 10
Lupyan Label-feedback hypothesis
REFERENCES
Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., and
Gleitman, H. (1983). What some
concepts might not be.Cognition 13,
263–308.
Athanasopoulos, P., Wiggett, A., Der-
ing,B.,Kuipers, J.-R., andThierry,G.
(2009). TheWhorﬁanmind: electro-
physiological evidence that language
shapes perception. Commun. Integr.
Biol. 2, 332–334.
Barsalou, L. W. (1987). “The instabil-
ity of graded structure: implications
for the nature of concepts,” in Con-
cepts and Conceptual Development:
Ecological and Intellectual Factors in
Categorization, ed. U. Neisser (Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversity Press),
101–140.
Bentin, S., and Golland, Y. (2002).
Meaningful processing of meaning-
less stimuli: the inﬂuence of per-
ceptual experience on early visual
processing of faces. Cognition 86,
B1–B14.
Black, M. (1959). Linguistic relativity:
the views of Benjamin Lee Whorf.
Philos. Rev. 68, 228–238.
Borges, J. L. (1942/1999).Collected Ficti-
ons. Penguin (New York, NY: Non-
Classics).
Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language
shape thought?: Mandarin and Eng-
lish speakers’ conceptions of time.
Cogn. Psychol. 43, 1–22.
Boroditsky, L. (2010). “How the lan-
guages we speak shape the ways
we think: the FAQs,” in The Cam-
bridge Handbook of Psycholinguistics,
eds M. J. Spivey, M. Joanisse, and
K. McRae (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Boroditsky, L. (2003). “Linguistic rel-
ativity,” in Encyclopedia of Cogni-
tive Science, ed. L. Nadel (London:
Macmillan), 917–922.
Bowerman, M., and Choi, S. (2001).
“Shaping meanings for language:
universal and language-speciﬁc in
the acquisition of spatial semantic
categories,” in Language Acquisition
and Conceptual Development, eds
M. Bowerman and S. C. Levinson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 475–511.
Carruthers, P. (2002). The cognitive
functions of language. Behav. Brain
Sci. 25, 657–674.
Casasanto, D. (2008). Who’s afraid of
the big bad whorf? Crosslinguistic
differences in temporal language and
thought. Lang. Learn. 58, 63–79.
Casasanto, D., and Lupyan, G. (2011).
Ad hoc cognition. Presented at the
Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society, Boston, MA.
Cassirer, E. (1962). An Essay on Man:
An Introduction to a Philosophy of
Human Culture. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Churchland, P. S., Ramachandran, V.,
and Sejnowski, T. J. (1994). “A cri-
tique of pure vision,” in Large-
Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain,
eds C. Koch and J. L. Davis
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press),
23–60.
Clark, A. (1998). “Magic words: how
language augments human compu-
tation,” in Language and Thought:
Interdisciplinary Themes, eds P. Car-
ruthers and J. Boucher (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press),
162–183.
Cohen, R., Kelter, S., and Woll, G.
(1980). Analytical competence and
language impairment in aphasia.
Brain Lang. 10, 331–347.
Cohen, R., Woll, G., Walter, W., and
Ehrenstein, H. (1981). Recogni-
tion deﬁcits resulting from focussed
attention in aphasia. Psychol. Res. 43,
391–405.
Daoutis, C. A., Franklin, A., Riddett,
A., Clifford, A., and Davies, I. R.
L. (2006). Categorical effects in
children’s colour search: a cross-
linguistic comparison. Br. J. Dev.
Psychol. 24, 373–400.
Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R. L., and Rober-
son, D. (1999). Colour categories
in a stone-age tribe. Nature 398,
203–204.
Davidoff, J., and Roberson, D. (2004).
Preserved thematic and impaired
taxonomic categorisation: a case
study. Lang. Cogn. Process. 19,
137–174.
Davies, I. R. L., and Corbett, G. (1998).
A cross-cultural study of color-
grouping: tests of the perceptual-
physiology account of color univer-
sals. Ethos 26, 338–360.
Deacon, T. (1997).The Symbolic Species:
The Co-Evolution of Language and
the Brain. London: The Penguin
Press.
Deco,G., and Lee, T. S. (2002). A uniﬁed
model of spatial and object atten-
tion based on inter-cortical biased
competition. Neurocomputing 44,
775–781.
Dennett, D. C. (1994). “The role of
language in intelligence,” in What
is Intelligence? The Darwin College
Lectures, ed. J. Khalfa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Desimone, R., and Duncan, J. (1995).
Neural mechanisms of selective
visual-attention. Annu. Rev. Neu-
rosci. 18, 193–222.
Dessalegn, B., and Landau, B. (2008).
More than meets the eye: the role of
language in binding and maintain-
ing feature conjunctions. Psychol.
Sci. 19, 189–195.
Devitt, M., and Strelny, K. (1987). Lan-
guage and Reality: An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Language. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Drivonikou, G. V., Kay, P., Regier, T.,
Ivry,R. B.,Gilbert,A. L., Franklin,A.,
and Davies, I. R. L. (2007). Further
evidence that Whorﬁan effects are
stronger in the right visual ﬁeld than
the left. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
104, 1097–1102.
Esterman,M., andYantis, S. (2008). Cat-
egory expectationmodulates object-
selective cortical activity. J. Vis. 8,
555a.
Evans, N., and Levinson, S. C. (2009).
The myth of language universals:
language diversity and its impor-
tance for cognitive science. Behav.
Brain Sci. 32, 429.
Fausey,C.M., andBoroditsky,L. (2011).
Who dunnit? Cross-linguistic differ-
ences in eye-witness memory. Psy-
chon. Bull. Rev. 18, 150–157.
Folstein, J. R., Gauthier, I., and
Palmeri, T. J. (2010). Mere expo-
sure alters category learning of
novel objects. Front. Psychol. 1:40.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00040
Foxe, J. J., and Simpson, G. V. (2002).
Flow of activation fromV1 to frontal
cortex in humans – a framework for
deﬁning “early” visual processing.
Exp. Brain Res. 142, 139–150.
Freeman,W. J. (2001).HowBrainsMake
Up Their Minds, 1st Edn. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press.
Gennari, S. P., Sloman, S. A., Malt, B.
C., and Fitch, W. T. (2002). Motion
events in language and cognition.
Cognition 83, 49–79.
Gentner, D., and Goldin-Meadow, S.
(2003). Language in Mind: Advances
in the Study of Language and
Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Gentner, D., and Loewenstein, J. (2002).
“Relational language and relational
thought,” in Language, Literacy, and
Cognitive Development, eds J. Byrnes
and E. Amsel (Mahwah, NJ: LEA),
87–120.
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., and
Ivry, R. B. (2006). Whorf hypothesis
is supported in the right visual ﬁeld
but not the left. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 103, 489–494.
Gilbert, C. D., and Sigman, M. (2007).
Brain states: top-down inﬂuences
in sensory processing. Neuron 54,
677–696.
Gleitman, H., Fridlund, A. J., and Reis-
berg, D. (2004). Psychology, 6th Edn.
New York: Norton and Company.
Gleitman, L. (2010). Economist Debates:
Language: This House Believes that
the Language We Speak Shapes
How We Think. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/debate/
days/view/632 [retrieved September
1, 2011].
Gleitman,L., andPapafragou,A. (2005).
“Language and thought,” in Cam-
bridge Handbook of Thinking and
Reasoning, eds K. Holyoak and B.
Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 633–661.
Goldstein, K. (1924/1948). Language
and Language Disturbances. New
York: Grune and Stratton.
Goldstone, R. L. (1994). Inﬂuences of
categorization on perceptual dis-
crimination. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
123, 178–200.
Goldstone, R. L. (1998). Perceptual
learning. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 49,
585–612.
Goldstone, R. L., and Barsalou, L. W.
(1998). Reuniting perception and
conception. Cognition 65, 231–262.
Goldstone, R. L., and Hendrickson, A.
T. (2010). Categorical perception.
Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Cogn. Sci. 1,
69–78.
Goldstone, R. L., Lippa, Y., and
Shiffrin, R. M. (2001). Alter-
ing object representations through
category learning. Cognition 78,
27–43.
Goldstone, R. L., Steyvers, M., and
Rogosky, B. J. (2003). Concep-
tual interrelatedness and caricatures.
Mem. Cognit. 31, 169–180.
Gopnik, A. (2001). “Theories, lan-
guage, and culture: whorf without
wincing,” in Language Acquisition
and Conceptual Development, eds
M. Bowerman and S. C. Levinson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 45–69.
Gregory, R. L. (1970). The Intelligent
Eye. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gumperz, J. J., and Levinson, S. C.
(1996).RethinkingLinguistic Relativ-
ity. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Harnad, S. (2005). “Cognition is cat-
egorization,” in Handbook of Cat-
egorization in Cognitive Science,
eds H. Cohen and C. Lefebvre
(San Diego, CA: Elsevier Science),
20–45.
James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychol-
ogy, Vol. 1. New York: Holt.
January, D., and Kako, E. (2007).
Re-evaluating evidence for linguis-
tic relativity: reply to Boroditsky
(2001). Cognition 104, 417–426.
Kemmerer, D. (2010). “How words cap-
ture visual experience: the perspec-
tive from cognitive neuroscience,” in
Words and the Mind: How Words
Capture Human Experience, 1st Edn,
eds B. Malt and P. Wolff (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press),
289–329.
www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 54 | 11
Lupyan Label-feedback hypothesis
Kemmerer, D., Rudrauf, D., Manzel,
K., and Tranel, D. (2010). Behav-
ioral patterns and lesion sites
associated with impaired pro-
cessing of lexical and conceptual
knowledge of actions. Cortex.
doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2010.11.001.
[Epub ahead of print].
Koivisto, M., Railo, H., Revonsuo, A.,
Vanni, S., and Salminen-Vaparanta,
N. (2011). Recurrent processing in
V1/V2 contributes to categorization
of natural scenes. J. Neurosci. 31,
2488–2492.
Kotovsky, L., and Gentner, D. (1996).
Comparison and categorization
in the development of rela-
tional similarity. Child Dev. 67,
2797–2822.
Kramer, A. F.,Weber, T. A., andWatson,
S. E. (1997). Object-based atten-
tional selection – grouped arrays
or spatially invariant representa-
tions?: comment on Vecera and
Farah (1994). J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
126, 3–13.
Kravitz,D. J., andBehrmann,M. (2008).
The space of an object: object atten-
tion alters the spatial gradient in
the surround. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 34, 298–309.
Kuhl, P. (1994). Learning and represen-
tation in speech and language. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 4, 812–822.
Kveraga, K., Ghuman, A. S., and Bar,
M. (2007). Top-down predictions in
the cognitive brain. Brain Cogn. 65,
145–168.
Lamme, V. A. F., Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
V., and Spekreijse, H. (1999). Sep-
arate processing dynamics for tex-
ture elements, boundaries and sur-
faces in primary visual cortex of the
macaque monkey. Cereb. Cortex 9,
406–413.
Lamme, V. A. F., and Roelfsema, P. R.
(2000). The distinct modes of vision
offered by feedforward and recur-
rent processing. Trends Neurosci. 23,
571–579.
Lee, P. (1996). The Whorf Theory
Complex: A Critical Reconstruction.
Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins
Pub Co.
Levinson, S. C. (1997). “From outer
to inner space: linguistic categories
andnon-linguistic thinking,”inLan-
guage and Conceptualization, eds
J. Nuyts and E. Pederson (Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversity Press),
13–45.
Li, P., Dunham,Y., and Carey, S. (2009).
Of substance: the nature of language
effects on entity construal. Cogn.
Psychol. 58, 487–524.
Li, P., and Gleitman, L. (2002). Turn-
ing the tables: language and spatial
reasoning. Cognition 83, 265–294.
Liu, Q., Li, H., Campos, J. L., Wang,
Q., Zhang, Y., Qiu, J., Zhang, Q.,
and Sun, H. J. (2009). The N2pc
component in ERP and the lat-
eralization effect of language on
color perception. Neurosci. Lett. 454,
58–61.
Loewenstein, J., and Gentner, D. (2005).
Relational language and thedevelop-
ment of relational mapping. Cogn.
Psychol. 50, 315–353.
Logothetis, N. K., and Sheinberg, D.
L. (1996). Visual object recognition.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 19, 577–621.
Lucy, J. A., and Gaskins, S. (2001).
“Grammatical categories and the
development of classiﬁcation pref-
erences: a comparative approach,”
in Language Acquisition and Con-
ceptual Development, eds M. Bow-
erman and S. C. Levinson (Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversity Press),
257–283.
Lupyan, G. (2007). “Reuniting cate-
gories, language, and perception,”
in Twenty-Nineth Annual Meeting
of the Cognitive Science Society, eds
D. S. McNamara and J. G. Trafton
(Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Soci-
ety), 1247–1252.
Lupyan, G. (2008a). The conceptual
grouping effect: categories mat-
ter (and named categories matter
more). Cognition 108, 566–577.
Lupyan, G. (2008b). From chair to
“chair:” a representational shift
account of object labeling effects on
memory. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 137,
348–369.
Lupyan, G. (2009). Extracommunica-
tive functions of language: verbal
interference causes selective catego-
rization impairments. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 16, 711–718.
Lupyan, G. (2011). Representations of
basic geometric shapes are cre-
ated ad-hoc. concepts, actions, and
objects workshop. Presented at the
Concepts, Actions, and Objects Work-
shop, Rovereto.
Lupyan, G. (in press). “What do words
do? Towards a theory of language-
augmented thought,” inThe Psychol-
ogy of Learning and Motivation, Vol.
57, ed. B. H. Ross.
Lupyan, G., Mirman, D., Hamilton,
R. H., and Thompson-Schill, S. L.
(2010a). Linking language, cogni-
tive control, and categorization: evi-
dence from aphasia and transcranial
direct current stimulation. Presented
at the Second Conference on the Neu-
robiology of Language, San Diego,
CA.
Lupyan, G., Thompson-Schill, S. L.,
and Swingley, D. (2010b). Concep-
tual penetrationof visual processing.
Psychol. Sci. 21, 682–691.
Lupyan,G., Rakison,D. H., andMcClel-
land, J. L. (2007). Language is not
just for talking: labels facilitate learn-
ing of novel categories. Psychol. Sci.
18, 1077–1082.
Lupyan, G., and Spivey, M. J. (2008).
Perceptual processing is facilitated
by ascribing meaning to novel stim-
uli. Curr. Biol. 18, R410–R412.
Lupyan, G., and Spivey, M. J. (2010a).
Making the invisible visible: audi-
tory cues facilitate visual object
detection. PLoS ONE 5, e11452.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011452
Lupyan, G., and Spivey, M. J. (2010b).
Redundant spoken labels facilitate
perception of multiple items. Atten.
Percept. Psychophys. 72, 2236–2253.
doi:10.3758/APP.72.8.2236
Lupyan, G., and Swingley, D. (in press).
Self-directed speech affects visual
processing. Q. J. Exp. Psychol.
Lupyan, G., and Thompson-Schill,
S. L. (2012). The evocative power
of words: activation of con-
cepts by verbal and nonverbal
means. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 141,
170–186.
Macpherson, F. (2012). Cognitive
penetration of colour experience:
rethinking the issue in light of
an indirect mechanism. Philos.
Phenomenol. Res. 84, 24–62.
Majid, A., Gullberg, M., van Staden,
M., and Bowerman,M. (2007). How
similar are semantic categories in
closely related languages? A compar-
ison of cutting and breaking in four
Germanic languages. Cogn. Linguist.
18, 179–194.
McClelland, J. L., and Rumelhart, D.
E. (1981). An interactive activation
model of context effects in letter
perception 1. An account of basic
ﬁndings. Psychol. Rev. 88, 375–407.
Mesulam,M.M. (1998). Fromsensation
to cognition. Brain 121, 1013–1052.
Mesulam, M. M. (2008). Representa-
tion, inference, and transcendent
encoding in neurocognitive net-
works of the human brain. Ann.
Neurol. 64, 367–378.
Meteyard, L., Bahrami, B., and
Vigliocco, G. (2007). Motion detec-
tion and motion verbs – language
affects low-level visual perception.
Psychol. Sci. 18, 1007–1013.
Mitterer, H., Horschig, J. M., Musseler,
J., and Majid, A. (2009). The inﬂu-
ence of memory on perception: it’s
not what things look like, it’s what
you call them. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn.
Mem. Cogn. 35, 1557–1562.
Mo, L., Xu, G., Kay, P., and Tan,
L.-H. (2011). Electrophysiological
evidence for the left-lateralized
effect of language on preatten-
tive categorical perception of color.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108,
14026–14030.
Mumford, D. (1992). On the computa-
tional architecture of the neocortex
II. The role of cortico-cortical loops.
Biol. Cybern. 66, 251.
Noppeney, U., and Wallesch, C. W.
(2000). Language and cognition –
Kurt Goldstein’s theory of seman-
tics. Brain Cogn. 44, 367–386.
Olshausen, B. A., Anderson, C. H., and
Van Essen,D. C. (1993). A neurobio-
logical model of visual attention and
invariant pattern recognition based
on dynamic routing of information.
J. Neurosci. 13, 4700–4719.
Ozgen, E., and Davies, I. R. L. (2002).
Acquisition of categorical color
perception: a perceptual learning
approach to the linguistic relativity
hypothesis. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 131,
477–493.
Paivio, A. (1986). Mental Representa-
tions: A Dual Coding Approach. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Papafragou, A., Hulbert, J., and
Trueswell, J. (2008). Does language
guide event perception? Evidence
from eye movements. Cognition
108, 155–184.
Pilling, M., Wiggett, A., Ozgen, E., and
Davies, I. R. L. (2003). Is color “cat-
egorical perception” really percep-
tual? Mem. Cognit. 31, 538–551.
Porter, P. B. (1954). Another picture
puzzle. Am. J. Psychol. 67, 550–551.
Prinz, J. J. (2004). Furnishing the Mind:
Concepts and their Perceptual Basis.
The MIT Press.
Puri, A. M., and Wojciulik, E. (2008).
Expectation both helps and hinders
object perception. Vision Res. 48,
589–597.
Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision contin-
uous with cognition? The case for
cognitive impenetrability of visual
perception. Behav. Brain Sci. 22,
341–365.
Rao,R. P., andBallard,D.H. (1999). Pre-
dictive coding in the visual cortex:
a functional interpretation of some
extra-classical receptive ﬁeld effects.
Nat. Neurosci. 2, 79–87.
Ratterman, M. J., and Gentner, D.
(1998). “The effect of language on
similarity: the use of relational sym-
bols improves young children’s per-
formance on a mapping task,” in
Advances in Analogy Research: Inte-
gration of Theory and Data From
the Cognitive, Computational and
Neural Sciences, eds K. Holyoak, D.
Gentner and B. Kokinov (Sophia:
New Bulgarian University).
Reynolds, J. H., and Chelazzi, L. (2004).
Attentional modulation of visual
processing. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27,
611–47.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition March 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 54 | 12
Lupyan Label-feedback hypothesis
Roach, A., Schwartz, M. F., Martin, N.,
Grewal, R. S., and Brecher,A. (1996).
The Philadelphia naming test: scor-
ing and rationale.Am. J. Speech Lang.
Pathol. 24, 121–133.
Roberson, D., and Davidoff, J. (2000).
The categorical perception of colors
and facial expressions: the effect of
verbal interference.Mem. Cognit. 28,
977–986.
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R.
L., and Shapiro, L. R. (2005). Color
categories: evidence for the cultural
relativity hypothesis. Cogn. Psychol.
50, 378–411.
Roberson, D., Pak, H., and Hanley,
J. R. (2008). Categorical percep-
tion of colour in the left and right
visual ﬁeld is verbally mediated: evi-
dence from Korean. Cognition 107,
752–762.
Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L.,
and the PDP Research Group.
(1986). Parallel Distributed Process-
ing: Explorations in the Microstruc-
ture of Cognition, Vols 1 and 2.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Slobin, D. (1996). “From ‘thought and
language’ to ‘thinking for speaking’,”
in Rethinking Linguistic Relativity,
eds J. J. Gumperz and S. C. Levinson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 70–96.
Sloutsky, V. M. (2010). From percep-
tual categories to concepts: what
develops? Cogn. Sci. 34, 1244–1286.
Snedeker, J., and Gleitman, L. (2004).
“Why is it hard to label our
concepts?” in Weaving a Lexicon,
eds D. G. Hall and S. R. Waxman
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press),
257–294.
Spelke, E. S. (2003). “What makes us
smart? Core knowledge and natural
language,” in Language in Mind:
Advances in the Study of Language
and Thought, eds D. Gentner and S.
Goldin-Meadow (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press), 277–311.
Spelke, E. S., and Tsivkin, S. (2001).
“Initial knowledge and conceptual
change: space and number,” in
Language Acquisition and Concep-
tual Development (Cambridge Cam-
bridge University Press), 475–511.
Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in lan-
guage and cognition. Cogn. Sci. 12,
49–100.
Tan, L. H., Chan, A. H. D., Kay,
P., Khong, P.-L., Yip, L. K. C.,
and Luke, K.-K. (2008). Language
affects patterns of brain activation
associated with perceptual decision.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105,
4004–4009.
Tanaka, J. W., and Corneille, O. (2007).
Typicality effects in face and object
perception: further evidence for the
attractor ﬁeld model. Percept. Psy-
chophys. 69, 619–627.
Thierry, G., Athanasopoulos, P.,
Wiggett, A., Dering, B., and Kuipers,
J.-R. (2009). Unconscious effects
of language-speciﬁc terminology
on preattentive color perception.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106,
4567–4570.
Vecera, S. P., and Farah, M. J. (1994).
Does visual-attention select objects
or locations. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
123, 146–160.
Vygotsky, L. (1962). Thought and Lan-
guage. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ward, E. J., and Lupyan, G. (2011).
Linguistic penetration of suppressed
visual representations. Presented at
the Vision Sciences Society, Naples,
FL.
Waxman, S. R., and Markow, D. B.
(1995).Words as invitations to form
categories: evidence from 12- to 13-
month-old infants. Cogn. Psychol.
29, 257–302.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, Thought,
and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Wiggett, A., and Davies, I. R. L. (2008).
The effect of Stroop interference on
the categorical perception of color.
Mem. Cognit. 36, 231.
Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C.,
Wu, L., Wade, A. R., and Borodit-
sky, L. (2007). Russian blues reveal
effects of language on color discrim-
ination. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
104, 7780–7785.
Witzel, C., and Gegenfurtner, K.
R. (2011). Is there a lateralized
category effect for color? J. Vis.
11, 16.
Wolff, P., and Holmes, K. (2011). Lin-
guistic relativity. Wiley Interdiscip.
Rev. Cogn. Sci. 2, 253–265.
Yoshida, H., and Smith, L. B. (2005).
Linguistic cues enhance the learning
of perceptual cues. Psychol. Sci. 16,
90–95.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or ﬁnancial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
ﬂict of interest.
Received: 02 September 2011; accepted:
11 February 2012; published online: 08
March 2012.
Citation: Lupyan G (2012) Linguistically
modulated perception and cognition: the
label-feedback hypothesis. Front. Psychol-
ogy 3:54. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00054
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Lupyan. This is an
open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion Non Commercial License, which per-
mits non-commercial use, distribution,
and reproduction in other forums, pro-
vided the original authors and source are
credited.
www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 54 | 13
